The People’s Party’s great paradox over Morocco has now come fully into view. In opposition, Alberto Núñez Feijóo can instrumentalize the Kingdom and the Sahara issue to attack Pedro Sánchez. Once in government, however, he would have to preserve a strategic relationship that no Spanish administration can afford to neglect. His latest statements illustrate this balancing act even before his potential arrival at La Moncloa.
In an interview with Okdiario, the PP leader announced that his first foreign trip as head of government would be to Morocco. «Without a doubt, I think the first trip should be to Morocco and, as far as I am concerned, it would be to Morocco,» he said.
This choice is far from insignificant. Feijóo thus acknowledges that any project to govern Spain must necessarily take the relationship with the Kingdom into account. He names neither Brussels, nor Paris, nor Lisbon, nor Washington, but Morocco. He also acknowledges that Rabat must be a «strategic partner» and that an «intelligent and effective» relationship would be «extremely beneficial» to both countries.
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Yet these remarks come in an interview in which Feijóo also describes the events in Ceuta as an «invasion», an «occupation» and an «attack on territorial integrity». He calls for a «firm» response toward Morocco and accuses Pedro Sánchez of behaving «more like a vassal of Morocco than the president of the Spanish government». Feijóo would therefore like to begin his potential premiership with a visit to the Kingdom, while multiplying the attacks that make such a rapprochement more difficult.
From accusation to backtracking in a matter of answers
There is no need to compare statements made years apart to find Feijóo’s contradictions. They follow one another in the course of a single interview. He begins by explaining that, if he were prime minister, he would have «a very serious discussion with Morocco» to obtain explanations as to how tens of thousands of people were able to reach the border and enter Ceuta. He also considers that the Kingdom has not provided «the response Spain deserves.»
But further on, his reasoning changes completely. «Honestly, I don’t think I have to ask Morocco for explanations,» he concedes, before turning his attention to the Spanish government. Feijóo then acknowledges that it was the responsibility of the Spanish intelligence services to detect the calls for mobilization circulating on social media and that Madrid should have contacted Rabat beforehand to prevent the situation from spiraling out of control.
Within barely a few minutes, Morocco is no longer the state from which Feijóo intended to demand explanations and confront with a firm response, but the partner with which the Spanish government should have cooperated to prevent the crisis.
This second analysis provides precisely the nuance erased by terms such as «invasion» or «occupation». Morocco has said that it warned Spain about the possible consequences of the Supreme Court ruling prohibiting the immediate return of people who had reached Ceuta or Melilla by swimming. Rabat believes that the decision weakened an essential component of migration cooperation, opening a breach that migrant-smuggling networks were quick to exploit.
Coordination between the two countries continued throughout the crisis. The overwhelming majority of those who entered irregularly returned to Morocco, while the Moroccan judiciary initiated proceedings against dozens of individuals suspected of having participated in organizing the crossings and the disturbances at the border. Evidence that subsequently emerged also points to digital campaigns and decentralized networks operated from several countries.
Feijóo, for his part, presents no evidence. He merely echoes suspicions that have taken hold among part of Spanish public opinion, while acknowledging that the principal failings may have stemmed from the Spanish authorities’ lack of anticipation and coordination.
Firmness always demanded of Morocco
The PP leader insists on the need to base the bilateral relationship on reciprocity. «If 70,000 people leave Spain and head toward the Moroccan border, I will stop them,» he says, arguing that Rabat should have blocked every crossing.
This comparison reveals a rather peculiar conception of cooperation. Spain expects Morocco to prevent thousands of people from leaving, dismantle networks, monitor kilometers of coastline, take back those who return and shoulder a large share of the consequences of decisions handed down by the Spanish judiciary. When the system works, it is treated as an obligation incumbent upon the Kingdom. When it gives way or is overwhelmed, the episode is immediately interpreted as a deliberate action against Spain.
Feijóo says he wants a «fluid and respectful» relationship, but his demands are directed almost exclusively at Morocco. He asks the Kingdom to prevent departures and accept returns, while barely dwelling on the Spanish responsibilities that he himself ultimately acknowledges.
His rhetoric thus oscillates between two positions that are difficult to reconcile. That of a candidate who must project firmness in the face of Vox, and that of a potential prime minister who is aware that Spain needs daily cooperation with Morocco on migration, policing, counterterrorism, trade and economic affairs.
Morocco accepts the returns; the obstacles come from Spain
The same ambiguity emerges over the minors who arrived in Ceuta. Feijóo argues that «the logical and appropriate solution» would be to return them to Morocco. Since they are the most vulnerable, he maintains, they should be the first to be reunited with their families. «Why the adults, yes, and the minors, no?» he asks.
In substance, this position coincides with the one defended by Morocco. Rabat has repeatedly said that it is prepared to take back all its unaccompanied minors present in Spain, provided the Spanish authorities remove the judicial and administrative obstacles impeding their return. Nor is this commitment new. It was already included in the joint statement issued by the two countries’ interior ministries in June 2021.
Feijóo is therefore right to point out that Morocco is prepared to receive them and that the Spanish government must activate the necessary diplomatic and administrative mechanisms. Where his argument becomes simplistic is in explaining how this should be done. Spanish law does not permit immediate collective returns. Each case must be examined separately in order to establish the minor’s age and identity, locate their family and ensure that returning them is consistent with their best interests.
The bilateral agreement between Spain and Morocco likewise requires guarantees, in each individual case, of either effective family reunification or placement in an appropriate protection facility. Rabat has made its readiness known. What remains is for Spanish procedures to allow that readiness to be translated concretely into returns.
For years, Spanish political and media debate has attributed to Morocco a supposed reluctance to take back these minors. Rabat categorically rejects this accusation and denounces the use, for «political purposes», of Spanish administrative and judicial obstacles that are subsequently invoked to hold the Kingdom responsible for returns that it itself is requesting.
The World Cup final cannot simply be decreed
The same tendency to promise what does not depend on the Spanish government alone reappears when Feijóo turns to the 2030 World Cup. «I can promise you, and I promise you, that the World Cup final will be played in Spain,» he declared, echoing Adolfo Suárez’s famous formulation. According to him, «the final is played in the host country, and the host country is Spain».
His reasoning rests on a false premise. The 2030 World Cup was not awarded to one principal host country to which two others were subsequently added. FIFA jointly awarded the tournament to Morocco, Spain and Portugal. All three are co-hosts, and none can claim in advance a right to stage the final.
The decision belongs neither to Feijóo nor to the Spanish government. It rests with FIFA, which has yet to rule on the matter. The joint bid identifies three stadiums capable of hosting the decisive match: the Santiago Bernabéu, Camp Nou and the future Hassan II Grand Stadium, between Casablanca and Rabat.
Morocco has sought to host a World Cup for more than thirty years. The Kingdom submitted bids for the 1994, 1998, 2006, 2010 and 2026 editions, coming close to succeeding on several occasions. The 2030 World Cup is the culmination of this long-held ambition, not a favor granted by Spain. Promising the final before FIFA has made its decision therefore amounts to disregarding the very rules of the joint bid that all three countries are required to uphold.
A first foreign trip does not make a foreign policy
Feijóo presents his potential visit to Morocco as a way of repairing Pedro Sánchez’s supposed «snub», after Sánchez chose France as the destination of his first foreign trip as prime minister in 2018. But the order of official visits is not enough to define a foreign policy, nor does it automatically make a government more respectful toward Rabat.
The relationship between Spain and Morocco hinges on far more sensitive issues: migration and counterterrorism cooperation, trade, energy interconnections, the organization of the 2030 World Cup and, above all, Spain’s position on the Moroccan Sahara.
On this last issue, Feijóo leaves the principal uncertainty unresolved. He has still not specified whether he would maintain Spain’s support for the Moroccan autonomy initiative or seek to return to the doctrine that prevailed before March 2022. The PP continues to shelter behind ambiguous formulations about international law and United Nations resolutions, while some of its actions have generated profound mistrust in Morocco.
This latest interview provides no answer on that point. It does, however, confirm one obvious reality: Feijóo knows that he will not be able to govern Spain against Morocco. That is why he wants to make the Kingdom his first foreign destination. It is also why, even amid his attacks, he ultimately acknowledges that the two countries have no choice but to reach an understanding.
The PP leader appears to have grasped the realities imposed by geography. What remains to be seen is whether he is prepared to relinquish the electoral benefits he derives from targeting Morocco before potentially arriving at La Moncloa. That is now his central contradiction. Feijóo wants to travel to Rabat as a prime minister, but continues to talk about Morocco as a candidate.
