There are questions one would rather never have to ask. This is one of them: does Tebboune intend to attack Morocco?
I obviously do not know his intentions. Besides, the man is as unpredictable as Gaddafi was, forever veering between two extremes. And, in truth, I do not even know who governs this country. But what I see worries me profoundly.
In recent years, with a bewildering acceleration over the past few months, a considerable shift has taken place in the Algerian regime’s approach. Western Sahara is no longer presented merely as an issue of decolonization, or of solidarity with the Polisario and the SADR. It is now officially a matter of national security, accorded the highest priority.
Words have meaning. When a state turns one external issue among many into a priority matter of national security, it changes the very nature of the problem. What is happening?
We can see that every institution is being mobilized, with all other business seemingly set aside. War rhetoric is multiplying. The media are beating the drums. Diplomats, politicians, academics and journalists are all entering the fray. The security services are whipping social media into a frenzy. Military exercises are multiplying at a relentless pace.
For years, Algeria has devoted enormous budgets to its military. More than $25 billion in 2025 alone. And that does not include off-budget spending. By expenditure, it is by far the leading military power in the Maghreb. According to experts, this new, ultra-modern weaponry is clearly offensive in nature. Every sector, in fact, is being mobilized in this direction. It certainly looks as though a genuine war economy is being put in place.
Admittedly, Algeria has vast borders, the Sahel is in crisis, even at risk of fragmentation, Libya remains unstable and terrorism has not disappeared. But are these threats enough to explain such a military effort? Algeria has known worse—the Black Decade—and emerged victorious thanks to the mobilization and courage of its people.
The question must be asked. It becomes unavoidable when these deployments go hand in hand with the constant designation of Morocco as Algeria’s existential enemy and when the Sahara issue becomes a priority matter of national security.
This is all the more worrying because other movements are emerging. In my previous column, I questioned the spectacular rapprochement between Algiers and Tunis and the possible formation of an anti-Moroccan Algerian-Tunisian axis. How far we have come from the idea of a Maghreb Union!
To the south, another battle is being played out. Mali has moved closer to Morocco on the Sahara issue. Algiers is now seeking to restore relations with Bamako after a period of severe tensions. There are security reasons for this: the two countries share a very long, highly porous border. But it would be naïve not to see the other issue at stake: bringing Mali back into Algeria’s orbit and using the balance of power to force it to reverse its rapprochement with Rabat over the Sahara.
Taken separately, each of these developments can be given a diplomatic explanation. Taken together, they reveal a policy and a strategy for putting it into effect. The word war immediately comes to mind.
At this stage, discussion and commentary are no longer enough. The alarm must be raised.
«It is no longer enough today simply to hope that Algiers and Rabat will finally talk to each other in order to reduce tensions. Morocco has extended its hand many times, but the Algerian authorities have systematically responded with contempt. The alarm must be internationalized before the conflict breaks out and internationalizes itself. »
— Boualem Sansal
Wars do not always begin because a leader seized by madness wakes up one morning and decides to invade his neighbor. They also begin when, over the course of years, the conditions that make them inevitable have been created. Borders are closed. Diplomatic relations are severed. Airspace is shut. The other side is turned into an existential threat. A war economy is established, along with a system for indoctrinating the population. All that is missing is the slightest provocation to ignite the fire.
That machinery is now in place.
Algeria and Morocco have been through this before, in 1963, with the Sand War. A war today would be infinitely deadlier. Two modern military powers would confront each other in a Maghreb surrounded by hotbeds of instability. Alliances, hostile foreign powers, displaced populations, armed groups, terrorism and mass irregular migration would quickly do the rest.
It is no longer enough today simply to hope that Algiers and Rabat will finally talk to each other in order to reduce tensions. Morocco has extended its hand many times, but the Algerian authorities have systematically responded with contempt.
The alarm must be internationalized before the conflict breaks out and internationalizes itself.
The United Nations Security Council must be called upon. So must the African Union, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the European Union and all the major powers that maintain close relations with the two countries. Public opinion must also be alerted.
There is another question, moreover, about which strangely little is said.
The United States, France and Spain have recognized Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara. What will they do if Morocco is attacked tomorrow? Will they support it politically? Militarily?
And since they have made strong political commitments on Western Sahara, they could, together with the relevant international institutions and other interested countries, establish right now a committee to assess and monitor the situation in the Maghreb.
Not a coalition against X or Y. But a vigilance mechanism open to anyone willing to lend support to peace in the region.
Its first task would be this: to ask Algiers to state officially what it means by its new designation of Western Sahara as a matter of national security.
What threat does Morocco supposedly pose to Algeria’s security?
What consequences does Algiers draw from this doctrine?
How and why does Algeria, which has never acknowledged itself as a party to the conflict, now consider it a matter of its national security? How far does it intend to go?
These questions must be asked now, publicly and clearly, before an incident turns diplomatic and intellectual questions into a military one.
Morocco itself should bring these concerns before international institutions. Not to accuse Algeria of preparing for war—no one can establish that today—but to request close scrutiny of a situation that has become objectively very dangerous.
Look at Libya.
More than fifteen years after the collapse of the state, it has recovered neither its unity nor genuine peace. It took very little time to open Pandora’s box. No one has managed to close it since.
A war between Algeria and Morocco could begin within hours, but it would surely last for years. Who would know how to stop it?
I do not know whether Mr. Tebboune truly intends to attack Morocco, even if he gives every indication that he might.
Those committed to peace are entitled today to ask him: Where are you taking Algeria, Mr. Tebboune? And to ask the army chief: How far, Mr. Chengriha, will the People’s National Army allow itself to be instrumentalized?
