A millennia-old state comprising several dozen ethnic groups and a population of roughly 140 million, Ethiopia is the linchpin of stability in the highly volatile Horn of Africa. This is a region where multiple crises converge and overlap: tensions between the two Sudans, ethnic warfare in South Sudan, civil war in Sudan, Somalia’s descent into anarchy, the Somaliland question, and more. Yet Ethiopia itself is now going through a complex security crisis, marked by persistent internal conflicts and acute regional tensions.
In the parliamentary elections of June 1, 2026, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party (PP) secured an overwhelming majority, winning 438 of the 501 seats. Yet this political dominance has been overshadowed by deep-seated ethnic tensions. For several months, the Ethiopian state has faced a proliferation of conflict hotspots. In Tigray, it proved impossible to hold the June 2026 elections. In several parts of the north, instability disrupted the electoral process, while in the Amhara and Oromia regions, where violence has been recurrent for years, state authority extends only so far because of the activities of regional militias.
Since 2024, Ethiopia’s 1994 Constitution, which came into force in 1995, has been beset by crises on several fronts. Built on a system of multinational federalism, it explicitly recognizes nations, nationalities and peoples, granting them the right to self-determination, including secession (Article 39). Yet constitutional interpretation falls to the House of Federation (HoF), a chamber that regularly issues politically driven opinions favoring the center over the periphery, thereby distorting the system. Moreover, the government now regards the right to secession as a threat to Ethiopia’s very survival as a unified state.
Ethnic federalism is now being challenged for two main reasons:
1- Because ethnically defined regional boundaries fuel territorial conflicts between Tigray, Amhara and Oromia.
2- Because federalism has been exploited by the central government, every demand for autonomy has met with rejection by the federal state. The result is a widening gulf between demands for autonomy and the government’s centralizing response.
«Ethiopia’s predicament is all the more regrettable because the 1994 Constitution may have offered a solution for sub-Saharan African states undermined by their ethnic divisions.»
— Bernard Lugan
Against this backdrop, the reforms proposed by the National Conference (2026) are radical:
- A transition from a parliamentary system to a presidential one, with a six-year presidential term renewable once.
- Abolition of the right to secession.
- A redefinition of relations between the central government and the regions.
- The possibility of replacing ethnically defined regions with geographical ones.
Yet because all these proposed reforms are designed to strengthen the state, they run directly counter to regionalist aspirations rooted in ethnic identity and are consequently perceived as an authoritarian recentralization of power. Under these circumstances, Ethiopia could face three possible scenarios:
1- A transition to a presidential system, but with the risk of regional uprisings.
2- An overhaul of the federal system through genuinely representative dialogue, but with the risk of weakening the state.
3- A slide towards fragmentation.
Ethiopia’s predicament is all the more regrettable because the 1994 Constitution may have offered a solution for sub-Saharan African states undermined by their ethnic divisions. It is equally regrettable from an economic standpoint, since Ethiopia recorded one of Africa’s highest growth rates in the second quarter of 2026. Before the outbreak of the current internal war, the IMF had projected growth of around 9% for 2026, while the UN had put the figure at between 7% and 8%.
