As things stand, and as Boualem Sansal wrote in a column published by Le360, the events in Ceuta-Sebta have brought to light the emergence of an anti-Morocco Algerian-Tunisian axis that negates the very idea of the Maghreb Union, despite the constant references made to it. Indeed, in the name of that union, Morocco should have received the support of its Maghreb “brothers,” particularly the Algerians. Instead, the migrant rush on the Ceuta enclave was opportunistically exploited by Algeria to stab its Moroccan “brothers” in the back. How quickly the past is forgotten!
Indeed, in the 1840s, “out of Maghreb solidarity,” Morocco supported Abd el-Kader against its own vital interests, leading to its defeat at Isly and the resulting territorial loss of its entire western region. Then, between 1954 and 1962, again out of “Maghreb solidarity,” Morocco carried on its shoulders an FLN whose fighting forces had been annihilated by the French army. In 1959-1960, once again out of “Maghreb solidarity,” Morocco rejected General de Gaulle’s proposal to return Béchar and Tindouf… so as not to betray its Algerian “brothers.” Finally, during the Sand War, and still out of “Maghreb solidarity,” Morocco did not order the FAR, despite their clear military superiority, to retake by force its provinces occupied by an independent Algeria that had inherited them from French Algeria.
«Algerian propaganda seized on the Ceuta crisis as a political opportunity to try to weaken Morocco’s international image and undermine its position with Spain and the European Union, which support it on the Western Sahara issue.»
— Bernard Lugan
While it seems reasonable, given what is currently known about the case, to believe that Algeria was not directly behind the Ceuta-Sebta affair, the intense and opportunistic exploitation it made of the episode, striking in its virulence, can be explained by the Western Sahara issue. Algiers has not, in fact, abandoned its aim of detaching the former Spanish colony from Morocco in an attempt to create a vassal “state” there that would give it access to the Atlantic Ocean. Under these circumstances, anything that can weaken Morocco serves its interests, which is why its services and proxies so opportunistically rushed to seize the chance to damage the image of its Moroccan “brother.”
All the more so because on October 31, 2026, the UN Security Council is due to renew or modify MINURSO’s mandate, in accordance with Resolution 2797 of October 31, 2025, which extended the mission until that date. The Security Council will then have to decide whether to endorse the diplomatic momentum built around Morocco’s autonomy plan, now regarded by a majority of its permanent members as the “most realistic, credible and pragmatic” basis for a political solution to the issue of the so-called Western Sahara.
Yet, faced with Resolution 2797, which supports the Moroccan initiative as the basis for a lasting settlement, Algeria continues to dig in behind the “right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination,” a convenient pretext for its separatist objective.
Under these circumstances, and as has just been said—but it bears repeating—Algerian propaganda seized on the Ceuta crisis as a political opportunity to try to weaken Morocco’s international image and undermine its position with Spain and the European Union, which support it on the Western Sahara issue.
Yet a reading of the international press, in Europe as well as in the Americas, shows that Algeria’s exploitation of the Ceuta tragedy has been seen for what it is: a crude and contrived piece of opportunistic manipulation.
