The negotiations over this year’s UN Security Council resolution on the Sahara offer a revealing lesson in diplomacy. Between the original US-drafted text, known as the “zero draft,” and the revised version that emerged from closed-door talks, Washington has made concessions on language and procedure without surrendering its central objectives. A close comparison of the two drafts shows how the United States has sought to build consensus around a fundamental change in the UN’s approach: placing Morocco’s autonomy proposal at the center of the political process and removing all references to a referendum, even from the name and responsibilities of the UN mission itself.
The fundamental shift remains intact
For all the changes to the wording, the resolution’s central political objectives have survived untouched. Neither the political framework nor the humanitarian provisions have been diluted. Both drafts establish Morocco’s autonomy proposal as the only basis for negotiations. The operative text continues to require the parties to negotiate on the basis of “Morocco’s autonomy proposal as the sole basis” and to submit formal responses within that framework. Both versions also retain a historic change to the UN mission’s name. The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) would become the United Nations Mission in Western Sahara (MINUSO). The original draft had proposed the more explicit title “United Nations Mission for a Political Solution in Western Sahara.” In either version, the word “referendum” disappears from both the mission’s name and its mandate.
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Washington’s diplomatic role is also preserved in full. Both drafts explicitly acknowledge “President Trump’s leadership in resolving the conflict,” welcome his appeal to the parties and reaffirm the Council’s full support for the UN Secretary-General, his Personal Envoy Staffan de Mistura and the United States in facilitating three rounds of direct talks held in Washington and Madrid. The humanitarian provisions are equally uncompromising. The requirement for the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, to “complete the registration of the refugee population in the Tindouf area within six months” remains word for word, as do the conditions that the process comply with international law, proceed without interference from any party and guarantee unhindered access. The provision moves from operative paragraph 10 in the original draft to paragraph 9 in the revised text.
Softer language, more room for maneuver
The revised draft makes several carefully judged changes designed to reassure Council members concerned about departing too sharply from established UN legal principles. The original text described genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as “the only viable solution.” The revised version adopts a less categorical formulation, calling it “the most feasible solution.”
The treatment of self-determination has also changed. The original draft confined explicit reference to the principle to the preamble, removing it from the resolution’s central operative paragraph. The revised text restores the “principle of self-determination” both to the amended preamble and to the operative provisions. In substance, however, this does not alter the direction of the resolution: autonomy is itself a form of self-determination, in principle, in its proposed terms and in practice. The more consequential changes concern the future of the UN mission and the timetable for its military restructuring.
The original draft imposed firm deadlines. It would have ended the mission’s peacekeeping mandate on April 30, 2027, and converted MINUSO into a “special political mission” from May 1 until October 31 of that year. The revised text removes that automatic transition. Instead, it extends the mission’s existing mandate until October 31, 2027, while retaining November 1, 2026, as the date on which the new name would take effect. The original draft also called for “a reduction of at least 50% in authorized uniformed personnel by January 31, 2027,” together with the immediate closure or consolidation of team sites. Both requirements have been dropped from the revised version.
Decisions on troop numbers and the future of the mission’s field sites will instead form part of a broader strategic review. Rather than mandating immediate changes, the revised draft asks the Secretary-General to submit detailed proposals by January 30, 2027, six weeks later than the December 15, 2026, deadline in the original text. More significantly, it introduces a new provision stating that the Council intends to “decide on the future of the Mission, including the transformation of its mandate, in light of the Secretary-General’s proposals and progress achieved in the political process.”
The revised text also takes a less confrontational approach to political responsibility. The original draft devoted an entire paragraph to condemning the Polisario’s May 5, 2026, attack on Es-Smara and expressed regret at the failure of one party—the separatist front—to engage in negotiations. In the revised version, condemnation of the attack is incorporated into a broader paragraph calling for an end to hostilities, while the criticism of the party’s lack of engagement has been removed. Another provision, in which the Council signaled its intention to “consider further measures if the parties fail to engage constructively,” has also been deleted.
The significance of these revisions is clear. They do not reverse the direction set by the original American draft. Morocco’s autonomy plan remains the sole basis for negotiations. The UN mission loses the referendum from its name, while addressing the situation of the populations held in Tindouf remains a priority. What Washington has conceded is the language, the pace of military restructuring and the timing of operational decisions, which will now depend on future reports from the Secretary-General. By yielding on those points, the United States has sought to remove potential obstacles to agreement while keeping the resolution’s central political provisions firmly in place.
