The European Parliament is preparing to debate the tragic events that took place in Ceuta on July 30 and 31 under a heading that already refers to “recent hybrid attacks” and the “instrumentalization of migrants.”
The problem is not that the European Parliament is examining these events. It has every right to do so, and the gravity of this tragedy indeed demands a rigorous analysis of its causes, how it unfolded and how it was handled operationally. The problem is that, even before the debate begins, its title appears already to have characterized the act, established its intent and, implicitly, identified who was responsible.
Yet a parliament should not begin with a condemnation and then search for evidence that might justify it. It should begin with the facts and, after an adversarial examination, arrive at a conclusion.
A Tragedy That Demands the Truth First
The events of July 30 and 31 created a humanitarian and security situation of exceptional gravity. Thousands of people headed toward Ceuta within a very short period of time. Lives were lost, families are still waiting for information, and public services on both sides of the border were placed under extraordinary pressure.
The first imperative, therefore, is dignity toward the victims, the missing, their families and everyone who was exposed to danger.
The Second Is Truth
Any possible failure must be examined. Any operational responsibility must be established. Every error must be acknowledged and every manipulation identified. But the gravity of an event does not automatically turn a hypothesis into evidence or a political accusation into a legally established fact.
Before using terms as weighty as “blackmail,” “hybrid warfare” or the “state instrumentalization of migrants,” an elementary question must be asked: what evidence is there of a decision by the Moroccan state to organize, direct or deliberately facilitate these crossings?
To date, no authenticated instruction, operational order, political directive or chain of command demonstrating such a decision has been made public.
Four Questions That Must Not Be Confused
To understand what happened, four different questions must be distinguished.
What happened on the ground, hour by hour and sector by sector? Were operational errors or shortcomings committed? What role did criminal networks, smugglers and online mobilization play? And finally, is there evidence of a political decision by the Moroccan state to provoke this crisis?
The first three questions deserve a full investigation. The fourth cannot be considered settled simply because the scale of the events was exceptional.
A border can be overwhelmed. Deployed forces can be confronted with a simultaneous, rapid and geographically dispersed movement. Errors of judgment or coordination can occur. But a temporary inability to contain every movement at every point does not, in itself, constitute evidence of an intention to facilitate it.
Capability must not be confused with intent. An operational failure, however serious, is not enough to establish the existence of a state strategy.
A Mobilization Prepared on Social Media
The events did not begin spontaneously on the morning of July 30. In the preceding days, calls for a mass entry into Ceuta had circulated on WhatsApp, Facebook and other digital platforms.
Groups with considerable audiences circulated gathering points, routes, times and practical instructions for crossing the border by sea or through the land perimeter. Information made public in Spain referred to groups followed by around 180,000 people.
July 30 was presented as an “opportunity” to be seized, on the grounds that Moroccan institutions and security services would be occupied with Throne Day celebrations.
Images and videos showing people who had apparently succeeded in reaching Ceuta then produced a powerful copycat effect. Interpretations—sometimes misleading—of certain Spanish judicial developments concerning returns at sea were also circulated as proof that the crossing had become easier.
Added to this dynamic were smuggling networks and criminal facilitators capable of instantly exploiting the virality of the content and the hopes generated by the first arrivals.
Online mobilization, false information, videos of successful crossings and practical instructions therefore constituted powerful factors in their own right. Recognizing them in no way removes the need to examine the conduct of the authorities. But ignoring them in order to reduce the entire crisis to a supposed decision by Rabat amounts to setting aside any evidence that does not fit a predetermined conclusion.
Morocco Was Intervening Even Before July 30
In the days preceding the crisis, Moroccan security forces had already carried out preventive operations. Departure attempts had been intercepted, gatherings dispersed, access to certain areas restricted and people suspected of helping organize the crossings prosecuted.
These interventions continued even during the period that some observers subsequently described as a deliberate “relaxation” of controls.
It is legitimate to ask whether the resources deployed were sufficient, whether the warnings were properly acted upon and whether coordination could have been better. It is not legitimate to automatically turn an alleged shortcoming into a political order, and then that supposed order into a “hybrid attack,” without producing the evidence needed to establish that chain of responsibility.
Why Choose Throne Day?
The choice of July 30 also deserves rational analysis.
Throne Day is one of Morocco’s principal national celebrations. State institutions and security services are mobilized across the country for official ceremonies and public events.
Messages circulated online explicitly urged would-be crossers to exploit this nationwide mobilization. The date therefore presented an opportunity for those organizing the mobilization.
By contrast, what interest would Morocco have had in deliberately provoking a massive crisis on that day? Why would it have chosen to endanger its own citizens, disrupt its own national celebration, expose its security forces to extraordinary pressure and trigger an entirely predictable international crisis?
The symbolism of July 30 weighs more strongly in favor of the date having been exploited by the organizers of the crossings than of the hypothesis of an operation planned by the Moroccan state.
Blackmail—but to Obtain What?
The term “blackmail” is being used extensively. Yet blackmail necessarily implies a demand, a condition or a concession sought through coercion.
What, then, was Morocco demanding? What ultimatum was delivered to Spain or the European Union? What concession did Rabat demand in exchange for stopping the crossings?
No such demand has been identified.
Blackmail without a demand, without an ultimatum and without a sought-after quid pro quo is not blackmail. It is a political characterization stripped of its essential factual element.
The notion of “hybrid warfare” requires even greater caution. It presupposes coordination, hostile intent and the deliberate use of multiple instruments to destabilize or coerce another state. It cannot be inferred solely from the scale of a migratory movement or from an alleged failure of border control during certain hours.
Otherwise, a precise strategic category simply becomes a media catchphrase used to give a hypothesis the appearance of fact.
What Happened Afterwards Contradicts the Theory of a Coercive Operation
Once the scale of the movement became apparent, Moroccan forces restored and reinforced controls. Morocco subsequently cooperated in the readmission of a very large number of people who had crossed the border.
It officially confirmed its willingness to take back the irregular migrants concerned and called for the urgent return of unaccompanied Moroccan minors to their families.
These actions are difficult to reconcile with the theory of a deliberate policy of instrumentalizing migration. A state engaged in a coercive operation would not simultaneously seek to prevent departures, restore control, accept readmissions and request the return of its minors.
Nor is Morocco’s migration cooperation limited to those two days. Between 2023 and 2025, Moroccan authorities prevented more than 227,000 irregular migration attempts, dismantled more than 1,050 trafficking networks and rescued tens of thousands of people at sea.
These results do not preclude criticism or grant Morocco immunity from scrutiny of its actions. They nevertheless demonstrate that its consistent policy rests on prevention, rescue, readmission and cooperation, not on the systematic use of migration as a weapon.
Instrumentalization May Have Occurred—but By Whom?
Vulnerable people were clearly encouraged to risk their lives on the basis of promises, videos, rumors and often misleading information. There is therefore a genuine question of instrumentalization.
But establishing that instrumentalization occurred does not automatically establish that a state was responsible for it.
The accounts that launched the calls, the administrators of the groups, the networks that circulated the routes, any potential sources of funding, the smugglers and the actors who amplified the content must be identified. It must be determined who manipulated whom, by what means and for what purpose.
The identity of those responsible for the instrumentalization must be demonstrated, not presumed.
The European Parliament Should Debate—but on the Basis of Facts
The European Parliament is fully entitled to examine the events in Ceuta, scrutinize mechanisms for protecting the EU’s external borders and demand answers from the institutions concerned.
But its debate would gain credibility if it clearly distinguished verified facts from allegations, operational failures from political intent, the actions of criminal networks from those of state institutions, and legitimate criticism from accusations unsupported by evidence.
The most useful response would not be a resolution based on characterizations decided in advance. It would be to establish a shared chronology, improve real-time information-sharing on alerts, strengthen efforts against smugglers and online incitement, coordinate responses to sudden movements, identify victims and missing persons, and ensure the lawful and humane return of irregular migrants and unaccompanied minors.
Morocco is not asking anyone to abandon critical scrutiny. It is simply asking that such scrutiny be comprehensive, balanced and subject to the same standards of evidence that Europe upholds in its own legal and democratic traditions.
Our two shores are bound by geography, security, human ties and shared strategic interests. Neither Morocco, nor Spain, nor the European Union stands to gain from turning a human tragedy into an instrument of political polarization.
The truth does not shield any government from its potential responsibilities. But it does protect democratic debate from an equally dangerous drift: delivering the verdict before establishing the facts.
*The author is writing in his capacity as Moroccan co-chair of the Morocco–European Union Joint Parliamentary Committee. The views expressed in this column are his own.
