MCC 2027: Which African countries are eligible for US assistance?

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has listed the “candidate countries” that may qualify for a future Compact under fiscal year 2027.

The Millennium Challenge Corporation has listed 45 African countries as candidates for potential U.S. development funding in fiscal year 2027, while excluding 10 others over legal restrictions linked to military coups, human rights, trafficking and rule-of-law concerns.

On 04/09/2026 at 16h00

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) published its first report for fiscal year 2027 to the US Congress on August 31, 2026. Published pursuant to Section 608(a) of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, the document lists “candidate countries” that may qualify for a future Compact, a substantial US funding program supporting policies aimed at sustainable economic growth.

For Africa, the report highlights the continent’s political divisions and differing governance trajectories. Of the 91 candidate countries listed, nearly half are in Africa, while the countries absent or excluded from the list tell a very different story.

The report sets out clear criteria. To qualify as a candidate country, a state must have a gross national income per capita below $8,105 for fiscal year 2027 and must not be prohibited from receiving US economic assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act or any other legal provision.

Status of African countries under the MCC 2027 report

SubregionCandidate countriesCandidate countries with reservationsExcluded countries (main reason)
North AfricaAlgeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia
West Africa / SahelBenin, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, TogoGuinea-Bissau, MadagascarBurkina Faso, Mali and Niger (military coups)
Central AfricaCameroon, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, São Tomé and PríncipeChad (Tier 3 ranking for human trafficking)
East Africa / Horn of AfricaBurundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Somalia, TanzaniaEritrea (human rights / Tier 3), Sudan (military coup), South Sudan (human rights / Tier 3)
Southern AfricaSouth Africa, Angola, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, ZambiaZimbabwe (targeted restrictions related to the rule of law, property and fundamental freedoms)

Note: Madagascar and Guinea-Bissau are listed with the explicit qualification that they will be considered candidate countries “to the extent deemed consistent with law,” leaving their eligibility uncertain.

Source: Millennium Challenge Corporation

Above all, the MCC states that final selection will be based on “a country’s demonstrated commitment to just and democratic governance, economic freedom and investments in its people.” In other words, US funding will go only to countries considered sufficiently aligned with these standards.

West Africa

West Africa illustrates particularly clearly the divide highlighted in the report.

On one side, countries such as Benin, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo are listed as candidates. Their inclusion indicates that these states retain sufficient credibility in Washington’s eyes in terms of governance and economic openness to potentially benefit from a Compact. Ghana, often cited for its democratic stability, and Cabo Verde, a small archipelago regarded as a model of sound governance, are familiar names in this type of ranking.

The other side of the picture is stark. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have been entirely excluded from the list of candidate countries. The report is unequivocal: the three countries are “ineligible for foreign assistance due to the military coup restriction under section 7008” of the 2026 US appropriations law.

Their exclusion is significant, depriving the three Sahel states, already facing major security and humanitarian crises, of access to a potentially substantial source of funding. The contrast with their coastal neighbors is particularly striking, drawing a regional divide between an eligible Gulf of Guinea and a sanctioned Sahel.

The cases of Guinea-Bissau and Madagascar are more nuanced but equally revealing. Both countries are listed as candidates, albeit with an explicit reservation: they “will be considered candidate countries to the extent deemed consistent with law.” The cautious wording indicates that their eligibility is not fully guaranteed and will depend on further legal assessment. This uncertainty reflects the persistent political fragility of both countries.

Central and East Africa

In Central Africa, candidate countries include the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. Based strictly on the report, these countries meet the income criteria and are not subject to legal restrictions.

Their inclusion, however, does not guarantee final selection. The report stresses that the candidate list is only a first step. The MCC Board of Directors will subsequently assess the relative performance of candidate countries in governance, economic freedom and investment in human capital. In other words, being a candidate does not guarantee selection.

East Africa presents an equally mixed picture. Major economies including Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia are listed as candidates. Ethiopia, despite recent conflicts, has not been excluded.

The region also includes several notable exclusions. South Sudan is deemed ineligible because of its human rights record and its Tier 3 classification under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, which applies to countries that do not make sufficient efforts to combat human trafficking.

Sudan is subject to restrictions related to the military coup, as are Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Eritrea is excluded on several grounds, including its human rights record and Tier 3 classification. Once again, regimes described as authoritarian or brought to power through coups are excluded, regardless of their economic potential.

Southern Africa

Southern Africa offers a particularly clear example in Zimbabwe.

The report states that the country is ineligible, notably under Section 7042(h)(2) of the 2026 US appropriations law, which prohibits, with limited exceptions, assistance to the Government of Zimbabwe until the US secretary of state certifies that “the rule of law has been restored, including respect for ownership and title to property and the freedoms of expression, association and assembly”.

The wording amounts to a damning indictment of Harare, highlighting violations of property rights and fundamental freedoms.

By contrast, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia are candidates.

Botswana, often presented as a model of stability and good governance in Africa, emerges as a natural candidate. South Africa remains in contention despite its economic and social difficulties, reflecting the strength of its democratic institutions. Mozambique, meanwhile, is a candidate despite past corruption scandals, demonstrating that the MCC’s initial screening is primarily legal rather than moral.

North Africa

North Africa stands out for its broad and uniform representation. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Mauritania are all listed as candidate countries. None is subject to a legal restriction.

This is notable because, despite their very different political situations, none of these countries has fallen into a category of ineligibility comparable to that affecting countries in the Sahel or Sudan.

Tunisia remains a candidate despite its political developments since 2021, as does Egypt. This indicates that the US legal restrictions in force as of August 12, 2026, do not cover these situations, or that broader geopolitical considerations may also be relevant.

For North African countries, however, candidate status merely opens a window of opportunity. Final selection will depend on measured performance.

A tool for transformation under conditions

The significance of this report goes beyond a simple classification. The MCC is an instrument of US soft power that can channel hundreds of millions of dollars into infrastructure, agriculture, energy and governance projects. Becoming a candidate, then eligible, and ultimately signing a Compact means gaining access to substantial funding, often tied to structural reforms. Conversely, being excluded means losing access to this leverage and, more broadly, facing stigmatization in the eyes of other donors and investors.

For African countries subject to sanctions, the consequences are twofold. On the one hand, they lose direct access to US funding. On the other, their exclusion from the MCC process sends a negative signal to financial markets and development partners: that of a country where the rule of law and fundamental freedoms are not guaranteed. At a time when Africa’s development financing needs are enormous, such exclusion may further deepen economic marginalization.

However, the report also contains a warning: the published lists may change. Candidate countries and excluded countries alike “may become subject to future restrictions or statutory determinations (for example, a country ranked Tier 3 in the annual Trafficking in Persons Report published by the US Department of State, without having received an appropriate waiver).” In other words, nothing is set in stone. A country that is a candidate today may be excluded tomorrow if its situation deteriorates, while an excluded country could be reinstated if major political changes take place.

This uncertainty is particularly relevant to countries such as Guinea-Bissau and Madagascar, whose candidate status comes with reservations. It also applies to countries such as Chad, which is excluded because of its Tier 3 classification, a category that may change from one year to another. The MCC thus operates as a dynamic barometer of global governance, with Africa serving as a particularly significant area of observation.

Ultimately, this first MCC report for fiscal year 2027 is only an initial screening process, but it already outlines a two-speed Africa. On one side is a majority of formally eligible countries, some of which will emerge in the next stages. On the other is a core group of excluded states: the AES countries, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, South Sudan and Chad.

Washington’s message is as clear as the funding it offers: US aid is not an entitlement, but a reward for those who follow democratic and economic rules. For African countries, the challenge is therefore twofold: remaining on the list of candidate countries and then proving their worth during the performance assessment.

The competition has only just begun.

By Modeste Kouamé
On 04/09/2026 at 16h00