Opinions

A factual audit from July 30 to September 17, 2026. Research concluded on September 18, 2026.

For Algeria, the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline is a priority because its own production is insufficient to supply an EU that has voluntarily deprived itself of Russian gas. Yet if the Trans-Saharan pipeline project were to go ahead, Algeria could export an additional 30 billion cubic meters. It would then become the EU’s leading gas supplier, radically increasing its leverage over the bloc, particularly on what remains a priority issue for Algiers: challenging Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara.

Abdessamad Ezzalzouli joined his teammates in wearing a shirt carrying messages about Ceuta before Villarreal-Betis, but as a Moroccan international, he could have chosen not to associate himself with a politically sensitive message.

As the European Parliament prepares to debate the recent events in Ceuta under a title that already describes the situation as a “hybrid attack,” Lahcen Haddad, Moroccan co-chair of the Morocco–European Union Joint Parliamentary Committee,* denounces a one-sided case that confuses capability with intent and calls for political verdicts to give way to a rigorous, fact-based examination of the tragedy.

The migrant rush on the Ceuta enclave was opportunistically exploited by Algeria to stab its Moroccan “brothers” in the back. How quickly the past is forgotten!

Heir to French Algeria, to which it owes its name, its borders and all its infrastructure, Algeria—until now the self-proclaimed “champion of anti-colonialism”—has, out of hatred for Morocco, become an advocate for the Spanish Empire. Its media have indeed gleefully relayed the remarks of a Spanish academic who dared claim that “until 1957, the Kingdom of Morocco did not exist.”

One can argue that the conquest of Ceuta dates back centuries. But one cannot infer from this that its territorial boundaries are equally old: they were pushed considerably outward in the 19th century.

Since this summer’s migration crisis, there has been much talk about what Europe owes Ceuta. It is time to look at what Ceuta costs Europe. These roughly 19 km² of Spanish territory on the African coast are heavily subsidized and supported by the European Union. But the cost of the presidios cannot be measured in millions of euros alone. While it is first and foremost budgetary, it is also political, bringing to Brussels the very divisions that the European Pact on Migration thought it had overcome. And above all, what is the price of responsibility? How far should European solidarity go when it is called upon to shoulder the consequences of national political choices?

In 1987, King Hassan II applied for Morocco to join the European Economic Community. The application was rejected: Morocco was not a European country. The answer seemed obvious. It is much less so today. For the same Europe that told Morocco it could not join the Community because it was African now tells us that two cities located in Africa constitute its borders.

Contrary to Spanish propaganda that goes to great lengths to deny its Moroccan character, the city of Sebta was administered by the Moroccan state, founded by the Idrisid dynasty, for more than six centuries. History provides the proof.

In recent years, with a bewildering acceleration over the past few months, a considerable shift has taken place in the Algerian regime’s approach. Western Sahara is no longer presented merely as an issue of decolonization, or of solidarity with the Polisario and the SADR. It is now officially a matter of national security, accorded the highest priority. Words have meaning. When a state turns one external issue among many into a priority matter of national security, it changes the very nature of the problem. What is happening?

As Moroccan football dreams of greater heights on the road to 2030, the idea of expanding the Botola to 20 clubs is gaining ground. Club presidents, coaches and now the UMFP are backing an expanded league. But before adding four teams, perhaps the first question should be whether the real problem with our domestic league lies in the number of clubs it contains.

After Qatar, it was predictable that the next major non-Western country to host the World Cup would come under particularly biased scrutiny. Morocco must therefore be prepared—not by retreating behind a posture of victimhood, but by responding with facts, quality, transparency and confidence.

As Casablanca emerges as a credible candidate to host the 2030 World Cup final, Morocco has become Spain’s convenient common opponent. The perceived external threat has helped shift attention away from a far more difficult question: the competition between Madrid and Barcelona to host the tournament’s most coveted match.

As Morocco’s bid for the 2030 World Cup final gains credibility, part of Spain is increasingly questioning it, arguing that if Casablanca gets the final, it will not be because of the strength of its bid.

Today, Morocco and Spain have an opportunity to transform a permanent source of tension into a shared project for the western Mediterranean. As for Algeria, sooner or later it will have to choose between the politics of deadlock and the path of regional reconciliation.

Acting on the instructions of King Mohammed VI, Supreme Commander and Chief of General Staff of the Royal Armed Forces (FAR), Lieutenant General Mohammed Berrid, Inspector General of the Royal Armed Forces and Commander of the South Zone, led a high-level delegation on a working visit Monday to the headquarters of the US Africa Command (US AFRICOM) in Stuttgart, Germany.